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ABSTRACT
Cryptographic hash functions are fundamental building blocks of many computer security
systems and protocols, primarily being used to ensure data integrity. Recent attacks against
modern hash functions have questioned the suitability of standard hash function construction
principles. In this paper we consider a hash function construction based multiplication in the
group of 2× 2 matrices over a finite field proposed by Ze´mor and Tillich [48, 42, 43]. We also
look at how the algebraic properties of hash functions following this design can be exploited in
attacks. Finally, we consider variations to the approach of Ze´mor and Tillich that offer some
resistance to those attacks.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Cryptographic hash functions are one of the fundamental building blocks in many computer
security systems. They are among the most versatile cryptographic primitives finding appli-
cations in a variety of areas. Cryptographic hash functions are typically used to provide data
integrity, attempting to prove that a piece of data is not modified accidently or intentionally.
However, they often find themselves used in a other seemingly unrelated areas, such as pseu-
dorandom number generation and password storage. Each security application involving hash
functions needs a different set of properties fulfilled by the hash function to achieve security.
Creating general hash functions which meet the needs of all or most of these applications is
difficult.
Unlike the other primary class of cryptographic primitives, encryption functions, most re-
searchers believe there is still much to learn about proper hash function construction. Largely
to build off the knowledge base of encryption functions, most hash functions today are con-
structed using an iterative design centered on block ciphers. There is a large body of research
on attacks against such hash functions. Until recently, however, these attacks did not pose a
credible security risk to hash functions in use. That quickly changed in 2004 and 2005 when
serious attacks were developed against the two most commonly used hash functions, MD5 and
SHA-1.
Efforts are currently underway to replace those hash functions. Some have suggested tweak-
ing the current design of hash functions to be resistant to current attacks. Others have sug-
gested creating new constructions for hash function design that are still related to the design
of encryption functions. A third option is to create a hash function using algebraic structures.
The mathematical structure of these hash functions often leads to some attacks, but that same
2structure can sometimes prove limited claims about the hash function’s security.
In [48, 42, 43], Ze´mor and Tillich propose two algebraic hash functions which are based
on computations in the special linear group of 2 × 2 matrices over a finite field Fp or F2n .
The hash function construction is related to the Cayley graph of the matrix group with a
generating pair. Colliding messages can be thought of as two distinct paths through this graph
that both start at the identity matrix at end at some arbitrary group element. Certainly the
high degree of algebraic structure in this hashing scheme opens the door for attacks that exploit
this structure.
This paper examines the hashing schemes proposed by Ze´mor and Tillich, as well as the
major attacks that have been developed against them. Chapter 2 introduces the concept of
hash functions and summarizes classical hash function design. In Chapter 3 we describe the
original hashing scheme over SL2(Fp) developed and analyzed by Ze´mor and Tillich, as well as
the flaws in the scheme. Chapter 4 describes the improved hash function which operates over
SL2(F2n) and the two major attacks that have been proposed. Finally, Chapter 5 discusses
variations of the basic hash function design.
3CHAPTER 2. CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASH FUNCTIONS
Cryptographic hash functions are algorithms designed to provide a level of assurance for
data integrity. These functions generally take as input an arbitrarily long message and output
a short digital fingerprint of the input data. This fingerprint is often referred to as a message
digest.
To understand the purpose of hash functions, consider the following motivating example.
In computer forensics it is necessary to provide assurances that digital evidence has not been
modified purposefully or accidently during the examination process. Prior to working with
digital evidence such as a hard drive, forensic analysts often obtain a message digest of the
original evidence. After the investigation is completed, any individual can compute the message
digest for the current state of the evidence and compare it to the stored message digest of the
original evidence. If the digests match, the individual can have some level of assurance that
the evidence was not modified.
2.1 Definition
The study of hash functions can be separated into into two cases: keyed and unkeyed hash
functions. While this paper will focus on unkeyed hash functions, we begin by providing the
definition from [40] for the more general case of keyed hash functions, also known as hash
families.
Definition 2.1.1. A hash family is a four-tuple (X ,Y,K,H) where the following conditions
are satisfied
1. X is a set of possible messages
42. Y is a finite set of possible message digests
3. K, the keyspace, is a finite set of possible keys
4. For each k ∈ K there is a function hk ∈ H where hk is a function from X to Y.
In particular, unkeyed hash functions can be defined as a hash family with only one possible
key. The functions inH are known as hash functions. A hash function can be defined as follows.
Definition 2.1.2. A hash function is a function h with the following two properties:
1. Compression: h maps an input from a domain X of large or infinite order to a codomain
Y of smaller order.
2. Ease of Computation: For an arbitrary x ∈ X , h(x) is easy to compute.
As an unkeyed hash function is a hash family with only one hash function, the terms
unkeyed hash function and hash function are used interchangeably.
2.2 Properties of Secure Hash Functions
While definitions 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 provide the baseline requirements for a hash function,
a function meeting only those requirements would not be suitable for security applications,
where they are commonly referred to as cryptographic hash functions. Cryptographic hash
functions are hash functions which meet one or more of the following properties.
1. Preimage Resistance:
Given y ∈ Y, it is infeasible to find a message x ∈ X such that h(x) = y.
2. Second Preimage Resistance:
Given a message x ∈ X , it is infeasible to find a second message x′ ∈ X such that x′ 6= x
and h(x′) = h(x).
3. Collision Resistance:
It must be infeasible to find two message x, x′ such that x 6= x′ but h(x) = h(x′).
5Certainly, collision resistance implies second preimage resistance. For this reason, collision
resistance is often referred to as strong collision resistance, while second preimage resistance
is weak collision resistance. However, there need not be any relationship between preimage
resistance and either type of collision resistance. Consider the following examples from [28,
Ch. 9].
Example 2.2.1. A hash function may be preimage resistant, but not collision resistant. Con-
sider h(x) = x2 (mod n) where n = pq and p, q are large primes. Since computing a square
root is equivalent to factoring n in this case, this function is preimage resistant. However, since
h(x) = h(−x) this function is not collision resistant or second primage resistant.
Alternatively, a hash function may be collision resistant, but not preimage resistant.
Example 2.2.2. Let g be a collision resistant hash function mapping to bitstrings of length
n− 1. Then define a hash function h by
h(x) =

1 || x if x has bitlength n− 1
0 || g(x) otherwise.
Finding a collision in h is equivalent to finding a collision in g. Thus, h is a collision resistant
hash function. Nonetheless, it is a trivial matter to find a preimage of any message digest
beginning with a 1-bit.
In addition, there are several other properties which are desirable, but not always necessary.
The specific properties needed are dependent upon the how the hash function will be used.
Examples of such properties held by commonly used hash function include the following.
1. Avalanche Property Every input bit should affect every output bit.
2. Near-Collision Resistance It should be infeasible to find any two inputs x, x′ ∈ X such
that h(x) and h(x′) differ by a small amount.
3. Partial Preimage Resistance Given y ∈ Y it should be infeasible to find even part of a
message x ∈ X such that h(x) = y.
62.3 Traditional Hash Function Construction
Modern hash function construction is traditionally done using an iterative approach. Most
commonly used hash functions today use an approach known as MD Construction, named after
Ralph Merkle and Ivan Damg˚ard who independently developed the design in [29] and [11].
The key idea behind the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction is that a hash function accepting
nearly infinite length bitstrings can be constructed using a compression function that maps
bitstrings of fixed length to bitstrings of shorter length.
Definition 2.3.1. A compression function is a function that maps elements from {0, 1}m+t to
elements of {0, 1}m where m, t ∈ N.
The construction works as follows. Let f be a compression function from {0, 1}n+t →
{0, 1}n. Take an input message m and break it into substrings of length t, so m = x1x2 . . . xl,
padding the last block with 0-bits as needed. An additional block, xl+1 holds the length of m.
The above steps are known as preprocessing the message. Next we iterate on the message
blocks using our compression function. Define a fixed constant with bit-length n and denote
it by H0. Iteratively construct the following sequence
Hi = f(Hi−1||xi)
from 1 ≤ i ≤ l + 1.
The final term in this sequence, Hl+1, can optionally undergo postprocessing. The result is
the n-bit message digest for m. This hash function construction is summarized in Figure 2.1.
The inclusion of an additional block composed of the message length is known as MD-
strengthening. This step prevents any padded message from being the tail end of any other
padded message. By adding this step, Merkle and Damg˚ard were able to prove in [29] and
[11] that if the underlying compression function f is collision resistant, then the constructed
iterated hash function is also collision resistant.
7Figure 2.1 MD Construction
2.4 Compression Function Construction
Compression functions for use in iterated hash functions are typically constructed using al-
gorithms resembling cryptographic block ciphers. In theory, widely accepted block ciphers such
as the Advanced Encryption Standard [32] could be used in the construction, although typi-
cally new algorithms are designed for hash function construction for computational efficiency
reasons.
Most current hash functions use the MD construction with a compression function based
on the Davies-Meyer design. In such a design, the compression function in each iteration of
the hash function is defined by
Hi = Exi(Hi−1)⊕Hi−1
8where Exi(m) denotes encrypting m with algorithm E using key xi. Thus, if E is an encryp-
tion function with a 192-bit key on 128-bit blocks, the resulting compression function maps
bitstrings of length 320 to bitstrings of length 128.
The next basic approach essentially reverses the roles of the message block xi and the result
of the previous round Hi−1. Instead, the key fed to the block cipher is Hi−1. If the length of
Hi−1 is not equal to the key length of E then a fixed transformation function g is first applied
to Hi−1. This approach is known as Matyas-Meyer-Oseas design and can be defined by
Hi = Eg(Hi−1)(xi)⊕ xi.
A variation of the above design was developed by Shoji Miyaguchi and Bart Preneel, which
modifies the algorithm above by exclusive-or-ing the result of each round with Hi−1.
2.5 Generic Attacks on Iterated Hash Functions
A common complaint against hash functions built on the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction is
that there are a variety of generic attacks that are effective against most hash functions of that
design. These attacks all make use of the iterative structure of the design.
Iterative hash functions typically use the output of the last round of the compression
function as the message digest, forgoing any final transformation. Because of this fact, nearly all
MD-based hash functions suffer from the length extension property, which allows the attacker
to calculate the hash value of an appended message without knowing the original message [16].
Consider an iterative hash function which is based on the MD construction that does not
include a message length block. Denote this hash function by H and let f be its compression
function. For any message with blocks m1,m2, . . . ,mi, the output of the hash function is equal
to f(H(m1m2 . . .mi−1),mi). From this fact, we can see that if an attacker knows H(m) for
some message m the attacker can compute H(m||m′) = H(H(m)||m′), for any message m′.
This attack assumes m, if necessary, is padded to have a length which is a multiple of the block
length of H.
MD-strengthening does not alleviate this attack if the attacker knows the length of the
original message m. By implementing MD-strengthening, a hash function creates a final block
9which encode the length of the hashed message. Thus, to perform this attack on a hash function
that uses MD-strengthening the first block of the message m′ must be chosen to be the binary
representation of the length of m.
This same principle allows a class of attacks known as second collision attacks [27]. Let
H be an iterated hash function without MD-strengthening and suppose an attacker finds two
messages M,N such that H(M) = H(N). The attacker can construct additional collisions
because H(M ||S) = H(N ||S). If H uses MD-strengthening the same result holds if the length
of M and N are equal and if S includes, as the first message block, the encoded length of M .
More recently, Antoine Joux developed an attack which allows an attacker to find 2k mes-
sages which hash to the same value using, on average, k2n/2 hash operations [21]. Typically
one would expect such multicollisions to be far more difficult to obtain.
To describe the attack, let H be an iterated hash function with compression function f .
Find two message blocks that collide in the compression function from the initialization vector,
i.e. f(IV,B0) = f(IV,B′0) = h0. Next, find two additional blocks which collide with h0. That
is, find B1, B′1 such that f(h0, B1) = f(h0, B′1) = h1. Continue this process up to finding blocks
Bk, B
′
k such that f(hk−1, Bk) = f(hk−1, B
′
k) = hk. Note that by the birthday paradox, if f
outputs n bits, then finding a collision, on average, should take 2n/2 operations.
These blocks, Bi, B′i, can be used to obtain 2
k collisions. Because of how they’ve been
constructed, all messages of the form b1b2 · · · bk where bi ∈ {Bi, B′i} hash to the same value.
Joux highlights potential applications of this attack in [21].
Some iterated hash functions are also vulnerable to second-preimage attacks. That is,
finding a second message which hashes to the same value as a given message. A brute force
search on an n-bit hash function should take roughly 2n operations to find such a second
preimage. However work by Dean [12], and recently improved by Kelsey and Schneier [23],
show that preimages can be found much more quickly. Their work is based on the notion
of expandable messages. Expandable messages are messages of different lengths whose hash
values, when calculated without a message length block are equal. The attacks in [12, 23]
work against all hash functions built on the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction.
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2.6 Modern Hash Functions and Security
Currently, one of the most widely used hash functions is MD5 [35]. MD5 was developed
by Ronald Rivest in 1991, and its widespread use comes from the fact that it was accepted as
an Internet standard. As such, it finds use in validating X.509 certificates and Secure Socket
Layers, the key element of secure websites today.
MD5 is an iterated hash function following the MD construction with a message digest
consisting of 128 bits. It uses a tailor-made compression function consisting of 64 iterations of
various bit operations and roughly follows the design principals of Davies-Meyer compression
function construction.
The security of MD5 has been severely challenged in recent years by an increase in com-
putational power and attacks. Because the size of the message digest is 128 bits, a brute force
search would find a collision, on average, after 264 attempts, barely within reach using current
technology. Recently a serious vulnerability in the algorithm was discovered by Wang, Feng,
Lai and Yu. In [46] they show how collisions can be found very quickly, reportedly only one
hour on an IBM p690 cluster. The attack is described in detail in [20].
Merely being able to find collisions in a hash function does not necessarily mean that
attacks against systems using the hash function are practical. In many cases, collision attacks
have limited practical effect on security applications. However, in 2005, Wang discovered an
attack involving a hash collision of two X.509 certificates [39]. This attack has serious security
ramifications for Internet communications.
Attacks against MD5 have been expected for over a decade. Until recently, the most widely
trusted hash function was SHA-1. SHA-1 was designed by the National Security Agency and
accepted as a Federal Information Processing standard in 1995 [31]. The general design of
SHA-1 is very similar to that of MD5. However, it uses a larger message digest, 160 bits, to
limit the practicality of finding a collision using a brute force search.
In 2005 the same research group responsible for the attack on MD5 discovered a similar
attack against SHA-1 [47]. The attack allows an attacker to find collisions after 269 attempts-
far less than the 280 attempts expected in a brute force search. The research group has re-
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cently announced an improved algorithm which would find collisions after 263 hash operations.
Consequently, the cryptographic community is moving away from SHA-1, and a competition
to replace the SHA-1 federal standard is in the early stages of development.
While serious, the attacks against SHA-1 do not pose an immediate threat to practical
security. In fact, despite these attacks being accepted as valid, no one has yet discovered a
collision using the attacks on the SHA-1 algorithm.
2.7 Mathematical Hash Functions
Traditional hash function construction is based on performing several rounds of complex
bit operations in a sequence that is difficult to reverse. Unfortunately, as shown by recent
attacks against MD5 and SHA-1, there is little guaranteed security. Some cryptographers have
long attempted to develop a hash function with a more trustworthy level of security by using
algebraic structures.
One accepted, but little used, mathematical hash function is the Modular Arithmetic Secure
Hash algorithm (MASH-1) [28]. The MASH algorithm roughly follows MD-construction by
iterating over fixed length substrings of an arbitrary length message, but it uses a compression
function based on modular arithmetic. The rounds of the compression function can be defined
by
Hi = ((xi ⊕Hi−1) ∨A)2 (mod N)⊕Hi−1
where ∨ denotes a bitwise and, N is a product of two primes, A is fixed constant, and xi
represents padded and expanded message blocks. While there is no proof of equivalence, the
purpose of this structure is to make the security of the hash function related to finding roots
modulo N .
Other approaches using algebraic structures are able to equate the difficultly of finding
a collision to a known hard problem. One of the earliest was proposed by Damg˚ard in [10].
Finding collisions in his scheme is equivalent to factoring an RSA modulus n = pq, where
p, q are primes. Other schemes exist with security relying on the discrete logarithm problem
12
[18, 7, 3]. Beyond factoring and discrete logarithms, knapsack and lattice problems are other
common sources for difficult problems [34].
Nearly all provably secure hash functions have two major drawbacks. First, the proven
security properties are strictly limited to either collision resistance or preimage resistance, and
do not prove that the hash function in question is suitable in practical applications. Also, the
hash functions are particularly slow, which effectively prevents them from being used.
13
CHAPTER 3. A HASH FUNCTION BASED ON SL2(Fp)
3.1 Hash Function Construction
In 1991, Gilles Ze´mor proposed a hash function in [48] based on Cayley graphs. His original
scheme was based on the Cayley graph of the group SL2(Fp). First consider the following
statement from [48].
Theorem 3.1.1. The group SL2(Fp) is generated by the following pairs of elements:
1. A1 =
1 1
0 1
, B1 =
1 0
1 1

2. A2 =
1 2
0 1
, B2 =
1 0
2 1

3. A3 =
1 1
0 1
, B3 =
2 1
1 1

The hash function proposed by Ze´mor is defined as follows. Let A,B be a pair of generators
of SL2(Fp) and let m = b0b1 . . . bn be a binary string. Then H(m) = pi(b0) · pi(b1) · · ·pi(bn)
where
pi(b) =

A for b = 0
B for b = 1
This hash function is strongly related to the directed Cayley graph associated with SL2(Fp)
and generators A,B, denoted by G. A messagem can be considered as a directed path in G from
the identity matrix to the value H(m). In this context we can use graph-theoretic approaches
to obtain proofs of security of this hash function.
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3.2 Properties of the Hash Function Construction
Recall that the hash function construction presented above is directly associated with the
directed Cayley graph G(G,S), where G is a group generated by the elements of the set S.
Definition 3.2.1. The directed girth of a graph G the largest integer τ such that given any
two vertices v and w, any pair of distinct directed paths joining v to w will be such that one
of those paths has length τ or more.
Considering the associated Cayley graph G(G,S), Definition 3.2.1 immediately leads to the
following property of the hash function.
Proposition 3.2.2. If we replace k consecutive elements of the product
x = x1x2 · · ·xixi+1 · · ·xi+kxi+k−1 · · ·xt
where xi ∈ S, with h consecutive elements yi+1, . . . , yi+h ∈ S such that
x = x1x2 · · ·xiyi+1 · · · yi+hxi+k−1 · · ·xt
then max(k, h) ≥ τ .
That is, in order to obtain collisions from local modifications of text, such modifications
must be made over at least τ bits, where τ is the girth of the Cayley graph associated with
the hash function. In other words, suppose we were given a message and we wanted to change
only a small portion of that message yet still retain the same hash value. For example, we
may want to change a message like ”I agree to pay $100” to ”I agree to pay $500”. According
to Proposition 3.2.2, it would be impossible to change a message like this without changing
the hash value. This provides a limited, but provable, measure of a hash function’s collision
resistance.
In practice, this property of the hash function would rarely provide protection against
attacks. In many cases, collisions involving two very different messages can pose serious security
threats. Also, the above property provides no assurance when its possible to change two small,
distant, sections of text, as would be the case if ”I agree to pay $100” was changed to ”I
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hereby agree to pay $500”. That being said, there may be applications where this property
would be useful. In some cases, hash functions are applied to messages that have very specific
formats and fixed lengths. If one changes too much of such a message it may no longer follow
the format and could thus be flagged as an invalid message. Under such circumstances, if the
girth of the graph is large enough, this may effectively make it impossible to create a properly
formatted colliding message.
For example, we can determine the girth of the Cayley graph associated with generators
A1 and B1. To do this, note the following lemmas.
Lemma 3.2.3. Let A =
1 1
0 1
 and B =
1 0
1 1
. Let S1, S2, . . . St ∈ {A,B} with S1 ·
S2 · · ·St =
a b
c d
. Then a, b, c, d < 2t.
Proof. We will induct on t. For the case t = 1, note that the values in A and B are at most
1 < 21. Assume that for l < t and S′1, S′2, . . . , S′l ∈ {A,B} then S′1 · · ·S′l =
a′ b′
c′ d′
 with
a′, b′, c′, d′ < 2l.
Next, let S1, S2, . . . St ∈ {A,B}. Define S1 · S2 · · ·St−1 =
a b
c d
. If St = A, then
MSt =
a a+ b
c c+ d
 =
a′ b′
c′ d′

Otherwise St = B, and
MSt =
a+ b b
c+ d d
 =
a′ b′
c′ d′

In either case, by the inductive hypothesis a, b, c, d < 2t−1. Thus, a+ b < 2 · 2t−1 = 2t, and
c+ d < 2 · 2t−1 = 2t. Therefore, in either case, a′, b′, c′, d′ < 2t.
Lemma 3.2.4. Let A =
1 1
0 1
 and B =
1 0
1 1
. LetS1, S2, . . . , St ∈ {A,B} with t < log2(p).
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Define M =
a b
c d
 = S1 · S2 · · ·St, with multiplication over SL2(Zp). If St = A then a ≤ b,
otherwise if St = B then a > b.
Proof. Let S1, . . . , St ∈ {A,B}, and S1 · S2 · · ·St−1 =
a b
c d
 = M . By Lemma 3.2.3, no
reduction modulo p occurs in the product S1 · S2 · · ·St, as each element of the matrix will be
less than 2t < 2log2(p) = p.
Note if a = 0, then det(M) ≤ 0. Since det(M) = 1, we must have that a > 0.
If St = A, then
M ·A =
a a+ b
c c+ d
 =
a′ b′
c′ d′
 .
Thus, since b ≥ 0, a′ = a ≤ a+ b = b′.
If St = B, then
M ·A =
a+ b b
c+ d d
 =
a′ b′
c′ d′
 .
Thus, since a > 0, a′ = a+ b > b = b′.
Lemma 3.2.4 allows us to determine a lower bound for the girth of the Cayley graph
associated with A1 and B1.
Theorem 3.2.5. The girth of the Cayley graph of SL2(Zp) with generators 〈A1, B1〉 is at least
log2(p).
Proof. Suppose S1 · · ·Sn = T1 · · ·Tm =M , with Si, Tj ∈ {A1, B1} and n,m < log2(p). Lemma
3.2.4 implies that Sn = Tm. By cancelling Sn = Tm from both sides and iterating this argument,
we see that Sn−i = Tm−i and m = n, for 0 ≤ i < n.
Therefore, if S1 · · ·Sn = T1 · · ·Tm = M are different strings of A1 and B1, then n or m
must be greater than log2(p).
Using similar arguements, we can conclude that the girths of the Cayleys graphs associated
with the generating pairs 〈A2, B2〉 and 〈A3, B3〉 are at least log3(p).
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While not technically a requirement for a secure hash function, a desirable and expected
property of hash functions is that the resulting hash values are equally distributed. In [43],
Tillich and Ze´mor claim the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2.6. If G is a Cayley graph such that the greatest common divisor of its cycle
lengths equals 1, then the distribution of hash values of messages of length n tends to equidis-
tribution when n tends to infinity.
The proof uses classical graph-theoretic methods by studying the successive powers of the
adjacency matrix of the graph. Of particular importance is how quickly equidistribution is
achieved. Sufficiently random graphs appear to provide the best results.
3.3 Attacks
The algebraic structure of this hash function can be exploited to find colliding hash mes-
sages. Significantly, this hash function is based on matrix multiplication in the special linear
group, which is associative. If an attack can find a factorization of the identity matrix of the
form a1 · a2 · · · at = I, ai ∈ {A,B}, then the string of zeros and ones that corresponds to that
factorization can be inserted into any message without changing the hash value. Furthermore,
the particular choice of generators {A,B} has an impact on the structure and can be exploited.
3.3.1 Find Element of Small Order
The group SL2(Fp) contains some elements of relatively small order. This attack attempts
to find a message which hashes to one of these elements.
The attack begins by computing the hash values of random messages until obtaining a hash
value which is a diagonalizable matrix. By [14, Sec. 12.3 Corollary 25], an n × n matrix M
over F is diagonalizable if its eigenvalues are in F and its minimal polynomial has no repeated
roots.
Suppose m is a bitstring which hashes to a diagonal matrix M . Then M is similar to
D =
λ1 0
0 λ2
, where λ1, λ2 are the eigenvalues of M . Note that Dk =
λk1 0
0 λk2
, and thus
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ord(M) = ord(D) = lcm(ord(λ1), ord(λ2)).
Since λ1, λ2 ∈ Fp, their orders will divide p − 1. Thus, given a factorization of p − 1 we
can easily compute the orders of λ1 and λ2. For the values of p which practical for this hash
function, factoring p− 1 is feasible.
Suppose ord(M) = d. Concatenating d copies of the message m will result in a message
that hashes to the identity matrix. The concatenation can be inserted into any other message
without changing the hash value of the message.
Certainly, however, this attack is only practical if the resulting concatenated message is
reasonably short. Therefore, this attack may need to be repeated several times before finding
a matrix with a sufficiently small order.
3.3.2 Symmetric Matrices
The particular choice of generators for SL2(Fp) can impact the security of the hashing
algorithm. Note that in the first two sets of generators of Theorem 3.1.1 A is the transpose
of B. This can be exploited in the following manner. Suppose a bitstring b1b2 . . . bn hashes
to a symmetric matrix. Then the message bnbn−1 . . . b1 hashes to the same symmetric matrix,
where b is the complement of b.
3.3.3 Density Attack
Tillich and Ze´mor proposed the following attack against the hash function in [42]. Their
attack notes the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3.1. Let U be the multiplicative monoid generated by A1 =
1 1
0 1
 and B1 =1 0
1 1
. Let M =
a, b
c, d
 with a, b, c, d ∈ N and det(M) = 1. Then M ∈ U .
Before we prove this proposition, let M denote the set
M =
M =
a, b
c, d
 , a, b, c, d ∈ N, ad− bc = 1

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and note the following lemmas.
Lemma 3.3.2. Let M =
a b
c d
 ∈ M. If a + b > c + d and a, b > 0, then a > c and b ≥ d.
If c+ d > a+ b and c, d > 0, then c ≥ a and d > b.
Proof. Consider the case when a+ b > c+ d and a, b > 0. Suppose a ≤ c. Then
a+ b > c+ d⇒ b > (c− a) + d ≥ d⇒ d− b < 0.
But, since 1 = ad− bc ≤ cd− bc = c(d− b), d− b = 1 > 0, which is a contradiction. Therefore,
a > c.
Suppose b < d. Then a > c+(d− b) ≥ c. Thus, 1 = ad− bc > ad− bc = b(a− c). However,
b(a− c) ≥ 1, since b and a− c are positive integers, which is a contradiction. Thus b ≥ d.
Now consider the case when c+ d > a+ b. Suppose a > c. Then d > (a− c) + b > b. Also,
1 = ad− bc > cd− bc = c(d− b). However, since c and d− b are positive integers, c(d− b) ≥ 1,
which is a contradiction. Thus, a ≤ c.
Suppose b ≥ d. Then
c+ d > a+ b⇒ c > a+ (b− d) ≥ a.
Also, 1 = ad− bc ≤ ab− bc = b(a− c). However, this implies that a− c > 0⇔ a > c, which is
a contradiction. Thus, b < d.
Lemma 3.3.3. Let M =
a b
c d
 ∈M. Then a > c if and only if b ≥ d.
Proof. (⇒) Suppose a > c. Then 1 = det(M) = ad− bc > cd− bc = c(d− b). Since c ≥ 0, we
must have that d− b ≤ 0, and thus d ≤ b.
(⇐) Suppose b ≥ d. Then 1 = det(M) = ad − bc ≤ ad − bc = b(a − c). Since b ≥ 0, we
must have that a− c > 0, and thus a > c.
We want to prove that any element of M can be written as a product of A1s and B1s.
Choose an arbitrary matrix M =
a b
c d
 ∈M. We will proceed by cases.
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Case 1: a+ b ≥ c+ d. We will induct on a+ b. Note that if a = 0 or d = 0, then det(M) ≤ 0,
a contradiction. Thus, when a + b = 1, it must that a = d = 1 and b = c = 0 and therefore
M = I ∈ U .
Now, assume that M ′ =
a′ b′
c′ d′
 ∈M when a′ + b′ ≥ c′ + d′ and a′ + b′ < a+ b.
If b = 0, then 1 = det(M) = ad, which implies that a = d = 1 and therefore M = Bc1 ∈ U .
Thus, combined with the statement above, we may assume without loss of generality that
a, b, d > 0. Now we must consider whether a > b.
Case 1a: a > b Then a = bq + r for q, r ∈ N, 0 ≤ r < b. Define
M ′ =
a− bq b
c− dq d
 =MB−q1 =
a′ b′
c′ d′
 .
If a′ = a− bq = 0, then a = bq. Since gcd(a, b) = 1, we must have that b = 1. Since d > 0,
by Lemma 3.3.2, 1 = b ≥ d > 0, so d = 1. Then, since 1 = det(M ′) = a′d′ − b′c′ = −c′, c′ = 1.
Thus,
M ′ =
 0 1
−1 1
 = A1B−11 =MB−q1
and thus M = A1B
q−1
1 ∈ U .
Otherwise a′ = a− bq > 0. Since d′ = d > 0, we have that 1 = det(M) = a′d′− b′c′ ≥ −bc′.
Thus 1 ≤ bc′ and since b ≥ 0, we must have that c′ > 0. Thus M ′ ∈ M and by Lemmas 3.3.2
and 3.3.3, b′ = b ≥ d′ = d and thus a′ > c′. Thus a′ + b′ ≥ c′ + d′. Therefore, by the inductive
hypothesis, M ′ ∈ U so M =M ′Bq1 ∈ U .
Case 1b: b > a Then b = aq + r for q, r ∈ N, 0 ≤ r < a. Define
M ′ =
a b− aq
c d− cq
 =MA−q1 =
a′ b′
c′ d′
 .
If b′ = b − aq = 0, then since gcd(a, b) = 1, we must have that a = 1. By Lemma 3.3.2,
1 = a > c ≥ 0, so c = 0. Since 1 = det(M ′) = a′d′ − b′c′ = d′, we have that M ′ = I = MA−q1 ,
so M = Aq1 ∈ U .
Otherwise b′ = b − ad > 0. Note that c′ = c ≥ 0. Thus, 1 = det(M ′) = a′d′ − b′c′ ≤ a′d′.
Since a′ = a > 0, we must have that d′ > 0. Thus, M ′ ∈ M, and by Lemma 3.3.3, since
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a′ = a > c = c′, b′ ≥ d′. Thus a′ + b′ ≥ c′ + d′, and by the inductive hypothesis M ′ ∈ U so
M =M ′Aq1 ∈ U .
Case 2: c + d ≥ a + b. We will induct on c + d. Again note that if a = 0 or d = 0, then
det(M) ≤ 0, a contradiction. Thus, when c + d = 1, a = d = 1 and b = c = 0, which means
that M = I ∈ U .
Now, assume that M ′ =
a′ b′
c′ d′
 ∈M when c′ + d′ > a′ + b′ and c′ + d′ < c+ d.
If c = 0, then 1 = det(M) = ad, which implies that a = d = 1 and thereforeM = Ab1. Thus,
combined with the statement above, we may assume without loss of generality that c, d, a > 0.
Now we must consider whether c > d.
Case 2a: c > d Then c = dq + r for q, r ∈ N, 0 ≤ r < d.Define
M ′ =
a− bq b
c− dq d
 =MB−11 =
a′ b′
c′ d′
 .
Suppose c′ = c−dq = 0. Then since gcd(c, d) = 1, it must be that d = 1. By Lemma 3.3.2,
1 = d > b ≥ 0, so b′ = b = 0. Thus, 1 = det(M ′) = a′d′ − b′c′ = a′, and therefore M ′ = I, so
M = Bq1 ∈ U .
Otherwise c′ > 0. Since b′ = b ≥ 0, we have that 1 = det(M ′) = a′d′ − b′c′ ≤ a′d′.
Since d′ = d > 0, we must have that a′ > 0. So, M ′ ∈ M and by Lemmas 3.3.2 and 3.3.3,
d′ = d ≥ b = b′ so c′ ≥ a′. Thus c′ + d′ ≥ a′ + b′ so by the inductive hypothesis M ′ ∈ U and
therefore M =M ′Bq1 ∈ U .
Case 2b: c < d Then d = cq + r for q, r ∈ N, 0 ≤ r < c. Define
M ′ =
a b− aq
c d− cq
 =MA−q1 =
a′ b′
c′ d′
 .
Suppose d′ = d − cq = 0. Then since gcd(c, d) = 1, we must have that c = 1. By Lemma
3.3.2, 1 = c ≥ a > 0, so a = 1. Thus, 1 = det(M ′) = a′d′ − b′c′ = −b′. Thus,
M ′ =
1 −1
1 0
 = B1A−11 =MA−q1
and therefore M = B1A
q−1
1 ∈ U .
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Otherwise d′ > 0. Note that a′ = a > 0. Thus, 1 = det(M ′) = a′d′−b′c′ ≥ −b′c′, or 1 ≤ b′c′.
Since c′ = c ≥ 0, b′ > 0. Thus, M ′ ∈ M, so by Lemmas 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, a′ = a ≤ c = c′ so
b′ < d′. Thus c′ + d′ ≥ a′ + d′, so by the inductive hypothesis M ′ ∈ U so M =M ′Aq1 ∈ U .
Thus completes the proof of Proposition 3.3.1.
The proof of Proposition 3.3.1 shows that given an element of M, it is easy to find a
factorization of that element into a string of A1s and B1s by simply applying the recursive
algorithm provided in the proof. Essentially this algorithm is applying the Euclidean algorithm
on (a, b) if a+ b ≥ c+ d, otherwise (c, d), and the quotients from the algorithm are the powers
of A1 and B1 in the factorization.
Example 3.3.4. Consider M =
31 9
24 7
. The following example performs the recursive
algorithm given above on M .
31 9
24 7
B−31 =
4 9
3 7
 ⇔
31 9
24 7
 =
4 9
3 7
B31
4 9
3 7
A−21 =
4 1
3 1
 ⇔
4 9
3 7
 =
4 1
3 1
A21
4 1
3 1
B−41 =
 0 1
−1 1
 ⇔
4 1
3 1
 =
 0 1
−1 1
B41
 0 1
−1 1
 = A1B−11
Thus, we see that A1B4−11 A
2
1B
3
1 =M .
The purpose of this attack, once again, is to find a factorization of the identity matrix using
A1, B1, using the above propositions. To do this, the attacker looks for a matrix with non-
negative coefficients in SL2(Z) that is the identity matrix modulo p. By the above propositions,
a factorization into A1, B1 can be found, which yields a factorization in SL2(Fp).
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The difficulty is finding a matrix of the form
M =
1 + k1p k2p
k3p 1 + k4p

that has determinant 1. This is equivalent to finding a solution to the equation
(k2k3 − k1k4)p = k1 + k4
for (k1, k2, k3, k4).
To find such a solution, Tillich and Ze´mor proposed the following algorithm in [42]. Choose
a small integer c. We can find a solution to the above equation by searching for a particular
solution such that k1 + k4 = cp. To obtain this particular solution, choose a random prime p′
of the same magnitude as p. Take k3 = p′. Next, we must solve the equation
k2p
′ = c+ cpk1 − k21.
To do this, we must solve the congruence equation k21 − cpk1 − c = 0 (mod p′). Thus, the
discriminant c2p2 + 4c must be a quadratic residue modulo p′. This occurs with probability
1/2. If the discriminant is not a quadratic residue, try different values of c and p′ until c2p2+4c
is a quadratic residue. Once this is found it provides the following solution

k1 =
cp+
√
c2p2+4c
2
k2 =
c+cpk1−k21
p′
k3 = p′
k4 = cp− k1
where
√
x denotes the positive representation of a square root of x modulo p′, if x is a quadratic
residue modulo p′.
Example 3.3.5. Let p = 19. We will find a matrix which hashes to the identity modulo p.
After a small number of trials, we discovered that if c = 5 and p′ = 17, then c2p2+4c = 1 = 162
(mod p′).
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Then k1 = (5 · 19 + 16)2−1 = 13 (mod 13) and using the above formulas, k2 = 63, k3 = 17
and k4 = 82. The resulting matrix,
M =
1 + k1p k2p
k3p 1 + k4p
 =
248 1197
323 1559

has determinant 1 and reduces to the identity modulo 19.
To factor M , note that the Euclidean Algorithm on (1559, 323) yields the quotients (in-
order):
{4, 1, 4, 1, 3, 3, 4}
Since c = 323 < 1559, the first of these factors gives a power of A1. Using these to implicitly
perform the recursive algorithm given in the proof of Proposition 3.3.1, we see that248 1197
323 1559
A−41 B−11 A−41 B−11 A−31 B−31 A41 =
1 −1
1 0
 = B1A−11
and so
M = B1A4−11 B
3
1A
3
1B1A
4
1B1A
4
1 = I.
This attack allows an individual to find a message which hashes to the identity matrix,
which in turn can be inserted into any other message to obtain a collision. It could also be
used to find primages of matrices whose determinants calculated over Z are 1. Even if a matrix
M ∈ SL2(Fp) does not have determinant 1 when calculated over Z, it should be possible to
modify the probabilistic algorithm provided above to find a matrix in SL2(Z) that reduces to
M modulo p. As such, this proposed hash function should not be considered one-way.
This attack was possible because the matrices A1, B1 generate the multiplicative monoid
of 2× 2 matrices over the natural numbers with determinant 1. This is not true for the other
generator pairs, 〈A2, B2〉 and 〈A3, B3〉. However, note that A2 = A21 and B2 = B21 . Thus, if an
individual performs the attack above using A1 and B1 and obtains a factorization with all even
powers, then that provides a factorization using A2 and B2. The likelihood that one run of this
attack would yield such a factorization is small, but an attacker could try this attack many
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times using different random parameter choices until such a factorization is found. Similarly,
A3 = A1 and B3 = A1B1, so a factorization involving B1s to only the power one would yield
a factorization using A3 and B3.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter we reviewed a hash function proposed and analyzed by Z’emor and Tillich
in [48, 42]. The hash function operates in the group SL2(Fp) = 〈A,B〉. It regards a binary
message as a string of As and Bs and multiplies the elements of this string to obtain the
message digest. The algebraic structure offers little guaranteed protection against attacks.
In Chapter 3.3.3 we showed how one can easily obtain a factorization of the identity matrix,
which then allows for the creation of infinitely many hash collisions. It may also be possible to
use the attack to find preimages. Increasing the value of p offers little protection against these
attacks and thus this hash function cannot be made to offer an adequate level of security for
cryptographic applications.
The particular choice of the generating pair 〈A,B〉 for SL2(Fp) can affect the hash function’s
resistance to attacks which find a factorization of the identity matrix. It appears to be difficult,
although not impossible, to use the attack discussed in Chapter 3.3.3 when A and B do not
generate all matrices of determinant one over the natural numbers. However, the attack
suggests a weakness in the hash function regardless of the specific generators used.
26
CHAPTER 4. A HASH FUNCTION BASED ON SL2(F2n)
4.1 Hash Function Construction
At Crypto ’94 Jean-Pierre Tillich and Gilles Ze´mor proposed a modified version of the hash
function described in Chapter 3, this time based on on the group SL2(F2n). To distinguish
between the two hash functions we will refer to the previous hash function as the Characteristic-
p hash function and this as the Characteristic-2 hash function. To define this hash function,
first let α be the root of an irreducible polynomial p(x) of degree n over F2.
Theorem 4.1.1. Let A =
α 1
1 0
 and B =
α α+ 1
1 1
. Then 〈A,B〉 = SL2(F2n).
For proofs of this theorem we refer the reader to [43, 1].
Once again, the hash function is defined by the following. Let m = b0b1 . . . bn be a binary
string. Then the map H : {0, 1}k → SL2(F2n) defined by m 7→ pi(b0) · pi(b1) · · ·pi(bn) where
pi(b) =

A for b = 0
B for b = 1
is the hash function. In this case, computations are made over the field F2n ∼= F2[x]/p(x).
The hash function could trivially be extended to operate over SL2(Fpn) for any prime p.
The field of order 2n is the most suitable choice for implementation, as elements of that field
are easily represented as bit-strings of length n and computations are the fastest. In [37],
Silverman describes a method for computing multiplication of elements in F2n with complexity
n+1. This effectively creates a 3n-bit hash function, as the fourth element of a matrix can be
easily determined given the other three elements.
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4.2 Security Properties
The construction of this hash function is identical to that of the Characteristic-p hash
function described in Chapter 3. As such, the girth of the Cayley graphs provides a lower
bound of security against local modifications of messages yielding collisions. The following
theorem establishes the girth for this Cayley graph.
Theorem 4.2.1. The girth of the Cayley graph associated with the group SL2(F2n) and gen-
erators {A,B} is greater than n.
To prove this theorem, first consider the following lemmas.
Lemma 4.2.2. Let b1, b2, . . . , bk ∈ {A,B} and k < n. Then b1 · · · bk has the form MA when
bk = A or MB when bk = B, where
MA =
 ak(α) bk−1(α)
ck−1(α) dk−2(α)
 ,MB =
 ak(α) bk(α)
ck−1(α) dk−1(α)

and ai, bi, ci, di are polynomials of degree i over F2[x].
Proof. We will induct on k. The base case can easily be verified by considering the elements of
A and B. Suppose the lemma holds for strings of length l < k. Next, let b1, . . . , bl ∈ {A,B}.
Suppose bl = A. By the inductive hypothesis the product b1 · · · bl ·A has the form al(α) bl−1(α)
cl−1(α) dl−2(α)
 ∗A =
 αal(α) + bl−1(α) al(α)
αcl−1(α) + dl−2(α) cl−1(α)
 .
Similarly, the product b1 · · · bl ·B has the form al(α) bl−1(α)
cl−1(α) dl−2(α)
 ∗B =
 αal(α) + bl−1(α) (α+ 1)al(α) + bl−1(α)
αcl−1(α) + dl−2(α) (α+ 1)cl−1(α) + dl−2(α)
 .
As l < k < n, no reduction occurs modulo the irreducible polynomial of degree n. Thus,
in both cases this follows the form stated in the lemma. In the case where bl = B the same
process can be used to show that the product b1 · · · bl · A has the form of MA and b1 · · · bl · A
has the form of MB.
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Lemma 4.2.3. Let S = s1, s2, . . . , sk and T = t1, t2, . . . , tl be two different strings of As and
Bs with k, l < n. Then the s1 · · · sk 6= t1 · · · tk
Proof. By the previous lemma, these strings can only have the same form if k = l and sk = tl.
By canceling sk from both sides and iterating this argument, we see that si must equal ti for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Thus, to see that the girth of the Cayley graph associated with SL2(F2n) is at least n, let
s1, . . . , sk and t1, . . . , tl be from {A,B} and l, k < n. By Lemma 4.2.3, the products s1 · · · sk
and t1 · · · tl must be different. Therefore the girth of the graph must be at least n.
4.3 Attacks
4.3.1 Discrete Log Attack
In 1996 Willi Geiselmann proposed an algorithm in [17] for finding collisions in this hashing
scheme. His attack is based on embedding the rings generated by A and B into finite fields.
Geiselmann’s attack provides a form for all powers of A (and B respectively). In this section
we will obtain the form for powers of A and the form for the powers of B can be obtained
analogously.
4.3.1.1 Mathematical Basis
Recall that A =
α 1
1 0
. The minimal and characteristic polynomial for A over F2n is
given by Aˆ(x) = x2 + αx + 1. There exists a ring homomorphism φ : F2n [x] → M2(F2n) such
that φ(x) = A, so φ(g(x)) = g(A).
Note that kerφ = 〈Aˆ(x)〉. Therefore F2n [x]/〈Aˆ(x)〉 ∼= imφ. As φ is a ring homomorphism,
imφ ≤ M2(F2n). And since deg Aˆ(x) = 2, imφ = {λA + µI : λ, µ ∈ F2n} = V . Thus, all
powers of A are in the subring V and have determinant 1. However, V can contain elements
other than powers of A. We want to determine when an element of V is a power of A.
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To do this, let β be a root of Aˆ(x) in its splitting field E. The Jordan canonical form
of A is given by
β 0
0 β−1
 and thus there exists a similarity matrix P ∈ GL2(E) such that
A1 = PAP−1 =
β 0
0 β−1
. Note that the orders of A and A1 are equal, and say ord(A) = d.
Furthermore, note that this implies that ord(β) = d in E∗.
Let M = λA+ µI ∈ V . Then M has the same order as
M1 = PMP−1 = λA1 + µI =
λβ + µ 0
0 λβ−1 + µ
 .
Certainly if M is a power of A then Mord(A) = 1, and thus Mord(A)1 = 1. This implies that
(λβ + µ)ord(A) = 1. This gives us the forward implication of the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3.1. Let β be a root of Aˆ(x) = x2 + αx + 1. Then a matrix M ∈ M2(F2n) is a
power of A if and only if the following conditions hold:
1. M = λA+ µI for some λ, µ ∈ F2n
2. det(M) = 1
3. (λβ + µ)ord(A) = 1
Proof. All that remains to show is the sufficiency of these three conditions. Suppose the three
conditions hold for some M = λA+ µI ∈ V where λ, µ ∈ F2n ≤ E. Then we have that
M1 = PMP−1 =
λβ + µ 0
0 λβ−1 + µ
 =
γ 0
0 δ

Because det(M) = det(M1) = 1, we have that δ = γ−1. By condition 3, (λβ + µ)d = 1 and
thus γd = 1. As E∗ is cyclic, it has a unique subgroup of order d, namely 〈β〉. Since γd = 1,
γ ∈ 〈β〉, and therefore γ = βt for some 1 ≤ t ≤ d.
Hence,
M1 =
βt 0
0 β−t
 = At1
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and therefore
M = P−1M1P = P−1At1P = (P
−1A1P )t = At.
The same argument can be applied to obtain the elements of V which are powers of B.
Theorem 4.3.2. Let γ be a root of the minimal polynomial for B, Bˆ(x) = x2 + (α+ 1)x+ 1.
Then a matrix M ∈M2(F2n) is a power of B if and only if the following conditions hold:
1. M = λB + µI for some λ, µ ∈ F2n
2. det(M) = 1
3. (λγ + µ)ord(B) = 1
4.3.1.2 Attack Algorithm
The proposed discrete log attack works as follows. Let β be of root of the minimal poly-
nomial of A and γ a root of the the minimal polynomial of B. Construct and hash a random
message to obtain an element C ∈ SL2(F2n). Assume that C = Ai1Bi2Ai3 for some powers
i1, i2, i3 ∈ N. By Theorem 4.3.1, a power of A has the form λ1A+ µ1I, and by Theorem 4.3.2
powers of B have the form λ2B + µ2I where λi, µi ∈ F2n .
Therefore, we can construct the equation
Ai1Bi2Ai3 = (λ1A+ µ1)(λ2B + µ2)(λ3A+ µ3) = C
which gives four non-linear polynomial equations over F2n , one for each of the four locations
in the matrices. We wish to solve this system for values of λi, µi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, but these four
equations are not sufficient to solve the system. For additional equations, we can add the
three equations for the determinants of the powers of A and B. Specifically, the equations
det(λ1A+ µ1I) = 1, det(λ2B + µ2I) = 1,and det(λ3A+ µ3I) = 1.
Next, attempt to solve this system of equations. If a solution exists, then according to
Theorem 4.3.1, then λiA+µiI is a power of A if and only if (λiβ+µi)ord(A) = 1, for i = {1, 3}.
Similarly, by Theorem 4.3.2, λ2B + µ2I is a power of B if and only if (λ2γ + µ2)ord(B) = 1.
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Assuming this is the case, then these three factors are powers of A or B. Thus we can solve
for the values i1, i2, i3 by finding the discrete logarithms of the matrices λiA+ µiI, i = {1, 3}
to the base A, and the discrete logarithm of λ2B + µ2I to the base B. These can be found by
calculating the discrete logarithms of λiβ + µi, i = {1, 3} to the base β and λ2γ + µ2 to the
base γ.
Note that β and γ lie in either F2n or F22n , depending on whether Aˆ(x) and Bˆ(x) are
irreducible over F2(α). If one or both of these elements are in F22n , then the corresponding
elements of the solution λi, µi are regarded as elements of F22n and the discrete logarithm is
computed in that field.
Note that this attack can be further generalized to find factorizations (and thus collisions) of
the form Ai1Bi2Ai3Bi4 · · · of length greater than 3. In the attack description above, note that
the system involved 7 equations and 6 unknowns. A fourth unknown matrix λ4B + µ4I could
be added to the system along with the determinant equation. Also, rather than checking the
conditions (λiβ+µi)ord(A) = 1 and (λjγ+µj)ord(B) = 1 after finding a solution, these conditions
could be added to the system of equations. This would potentially allow for factorizations with
any length of unknown matrices.
4.3.1.3 Solving Multivariate Polynomial Systems over Finite Fields
The attack described above involves solving a small system of non-linear multivariate poly-
nomials over a finite field. This is a non-trivial task, but there does exist methods for accom-
plishing this. Typically, Gro¨bner bases are used to reduce the system into a more manageable
form.
Let f1, f2, . . . , fm ∈ F[x1, x2, . . . , xn] be a system of polynomial equations over a field F.
The set of solutions to this system is given by
V = {a = (a1, . . . an) ∈ Fn | f1(a) = f2(a) = · · · = fm(a) = 0}.
If I is the ideal generated by f1, . . . , fm, then [25, Chapter 5.9] notes that V is also given by
V = {a = (a1, . . . an) ∈ Fn | f(a) = 0 for all f ∈ I}.
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Therefore, if g1, . . . , gr ∈ F[x1, . . . xn] is another generating set for I, then the solutions for
g1 = · · · = gr = 0 are the same as the solutions for f1 = · · · = fm = 0. In this case, we are
interested in obtaining a generated set for I of a particular form, specially a Gro¨bner basis.
Gro¨bner bases are constructed dependent on an ordering of the monomial terms in poly-
nomials. Before we provide a definition of a Gro¨bner basis, we will first introduce monomial
orderings and leading terms. Dummit and Foote define a monomial ordering as follows [14].
Definition 4.3.3. A monomial ordering is a well ordering ≥ on the set of monomials that
satisfies mm1 ≥ mm2 whenever m1 ≥ m2 for monomials m,m1,m2.
Typically, monomial orderings are constructed lexicographically using an ordering on the
variables x1, x2, . . . , xn. If we use the ordering x1 > x2 > · · · > xn, a monomial Axa11 xa22 · · ·xann
has a higher order than Bxb11 x
b2
2 · · ·xbnn if (a1, a2, . . . , an) is lexicographically greater than
b1, b2, · · · , bn. The leading term of a polynomial f is the monomial term in f of maximal
order. With this, we can provide the definition of a Gro¨bner basis.
Definition 4.3.4. [14, Section 9.6] A Gro¨bner basis for an ideal I in F[x1, · · · , xn] is a finite
set of generators {g1, . . . , gm} for I whose leading terms generate the ideal of all leading terms
of I.
Gro¨bner bases can be computed using Buchberger’s Algorithm [5, 14, 25]. If the ideal I is
zero-dimensional, then the more efficient FGLM algorithm can be used [15].
To solve a system of polynomial equations f1, f2, . . . , fm ∈ F[x1, x2, . . . , xn] we wish to find
elements in the ideal I = 〈f1, . . . fm〉 which contain only some of the variables x1, . . . , xn. The
following theorem helps us find such elements when they exist.
Theorem 4.3.5. [14, Section 9.6] Let f1, f2, . . . , fm ∈ F[x1, x2, . . . , xn] and I = 〈f1, . . . , fm〉.
Suppose G = {g1, . . . gr} is a Gro¨bner basis for I using the ordering x1 > x2 > · · · > xn. Then
G ∩ F[xi+1, . . . , xn] is a Gro¨bner basis of the elimination ideal Ii = I ∩ F[xi+1, . . . , xn].
In an ideal case, each elimination ideal Ii is non-zero, which implies that there exists a
polynomial g ∈ G that involves only the polynomials xi+1, . . . , xn. Thus we could use g ∈ F[xn]
33
to solve for xn, and back-substitute to solve for xn−1 using g′ ∈ F[xn−1, xn], repeating this
process of back-substitution until a complete solution is found.
Gro¨bner bases are not always successful at solving systems of multivariate polynomial
equations. Recently, Ding, Gower and Schmidt developed a new way to solve systems of
polynomial equations over finite fields [13]. Their method involves lifting the problem to an
extension field where they system becomes a single-variable equation. Then it is possible to
apply the known methods for solving univariate equations over finite fields. For instance, the
Berlekamp algorithm [4] can factor polynomials if the degree is relatively small.
4.3.1.4 Example
We implemented the attack using the Axiom computer algebra system [33]. The code for
this attack can be found in Appendix A. Based on this implementation, we have found that
the collisions discovered by this attack are highly impractical, which the author freely admits
in [17].
For example, using the Axiom implementation found in Appendix A, we discovered the
following collision when this hash calculated over F260 represented as F2[x]/〈x60 + x+ 1〉.
A160 ∗B258 = A22367311414644889B1152921504606846719A22367311414644729
In particular, note that in this instance
ord(A) = ord(B) = 1152921504606846977 = 260 + 1
4.3.1.5 Practicality of Attack
In practice, the powers on A and B discovered in the attack are usually roughly equal to
the orders of A and B in magnitude. The example above used the field F260 whereas a more
realistic implementations of this hash function would use F2n where n is at least 120. In this
case, the orders of A and B will divide either 2120+1 or 2120−1. As the orders of A and B are
dependent on not only the degree but also the choice of the irreducible polynomial, it would
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be possible calculate the orders of A and B using different irreducible polynomials of degree n
until their orders are 2n + 1 or 2n − 1.
Even with n = 60, the example above found a collision involving approximately 1.2× 1018
bits. To put this number into perspective, this is roughly a message of size 132, 000 terabytes,
hardly a reasonable message size. This attack algorithm, in general, would find an even longer
message in order to obtain collisions using a field with a more realistic value of n.
However, it should be noted that this attack is surprisingly efficient, relative to most attacks
against cryptographic systems. There are two computationally expensive operations in this
attack. The first is to solve the system of non-linear polynomial equations over the field.
However, since the system is small and the polynomials are of small degree it is relatively easy
to compute the Gro¨bner basis and find a solution if one exists.
The complexity of the attack is instead dominated by the calculations of the discrete
logarithms in either F2n or F22n . Calculating discrete logarithms is generally considered a
hard problem. In fact, many cryptosystems are based on the difficulty of calculating discrete
logarithms. However, computing discrete logarithms in fields of characteristic p is much easier
when p is small. Coppersmith developed efficient methods for calculating discrete logarithms
such fields, creating a variant of the index-calculus method that runs in time exp(n1/3) in fields
F2n [8, 9]. Other methods using the function field sieve that claim to be even faster [22]. Thome´
was able to compute discrete logarithms in the field F2607 using a variation of Coppersmith’s
algorithm and believe that computations in fields as large as F2997 are within reach of well-
funded institutions [41].
Based on this, it is not possible to choose a large enough value for n such that computing
the discrete logarithms is prohibitively difficult without making the hash function impractical.
Nonetheless, it is a simple matter to make this step as difficult as possible. Recall that if the
minimal polynomials for A and B are irreducible over F2(α), then the discrete logarithms are
computed in the field F22n . Thus, by choosing the irreducible polynomial carefully we can
make this attack harder without much difficulty or reduction in efficiency.
Because the message lengths of colliding messages are extremely long it is unlikely that this
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attack could be used in practice to compromise the this hash function. However, the existence
and efficiency of this attack does seriously question the security of the Characteristic-2 hash
function.
4.3.2 Small Order Attack
At the Crypto 2000 conference, Steinwandt, Grassl, Geiselmann and Beth described an
attack against the Tillich-Ze´mor scheme that obtains a factorization of the identity matrix by
finding an element of SL2(F2n) of small order [38]. Once a factorization of the identity matrix
is found as a product of A’s and B’s an unlimited number of messages with colliding hash
values can be found.
4.3.2.1 Mathematical Basis
The attack is based on the fact that there are elements of SL2(F2n) that have small orders.
First consider the following property about the order of elements from this group.
Theorem 4.3.6. Let p be a prime and m be a positive integer. Suppose M ∈ SL2(Fpm). Then
ord(M)|pm + 1 or ord(M)|pm − 1.
Proof. Let g(x) = x2 + ax+ b be the characteristic polynomial for M . Proceed by cases.
Case 1: Suppose g(x) is irreducible over Fpm . Then g(x) = (x− α)(x− β) ∈ E[x], where
E is the splitting field Fpm(α) = Fp2m . By considering the Frobenius automorphism, note
that β = αp
m
, since the only non-trivial member of Gal(E/Fpm) maps x 7→ xpm . Also, the
determinant of M is equal to the product of the eigenvalues of M . Thus αβ = αp
m+1 = 1.
Since M is similar to
α 0
0 β
 in E, we have that ord(M) = ord(α)|pm + 1.
Case 2: Suppose g(x) is reducible over Fpm . Then g(x) = (x−α)(x−β) where α, β ∈ Fpm .
Again, the determinant of M is the product of the eigenvalues, so αβ = 1 and thus β = α−1.
Since α ∈ F∗pm , ord(α) = ord(β)|pm − 1.
Note that M is similar to either
α 0
0 β
 or
α 0
1 α
 depending on whether the eigenvalues
α, β are distinct.
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If M ∼
α 0
1 α
, then α = ±1. In this case, ord(M) = p. Otherwise, α = −1, in which
case ord(M) = lcm(2, p).
If M ∼
α 0
0 β
 =
α 0
0 α−1
, then ord(M) = ord(α)|pm − 1.
By the above theorem, if a matrix M ∈ SL2(F2n) is found whose entries lie in F2m) ≤ F2n ,
the order of M will be bounded above by 2m + 1. More generally, if a matrix M ∈ SL2(F2n
is similar to a matrix in SL2(F2m), the order of M will be bounded by 2m + 1. The trace
operation can be used to test whether a given matrix satisfies this property.
Theorem 4.3.7. Let M ∈ SL2(Fpn) and Fpm ≤ Fpn. Then M is similar to a matrix in
SL2(Fpm) if and only if the trace of M is an element of Fpm.
Proof. The forward implication is obvious from the closure of Fpm under addition.
Suppose the trace of M is in Fpm . Let g(x) be the minimal polynomial for M . If g(x) is
linear, then M = ±I2 ∈ SL2(Fp).
If g(x) is not linear, then g(x) = x2− trace(M)x+1. Suppose that g(x) = (x−α)(x−β) ∈
Fpn(α)[x]. Then M is similar to its Jordan canonical form in GL2(Fpn(α)), which is
α 1
0 α

if α = β or
α 0
0 β
 otherwise.
In the first case, we have that α2 = 1, so α = ±1. Thus, the Jordan canonical form of M
is in SL2(Fp).
In the second case, consider the matrix M ′ =
trace(M) −1
1 0
 ∈ SL2(Fpm) whose charac-
teristic polynomial is g(x) = (x− α)(x− β). Since α, β are distinct, M ′ is similar to
α 0
0 β
.
Thus, M is similar to M ′ ∈ SL2(Fpm).
As a direct consequence of Theorems 4.3.6 and 4.3.7, if the trace of a matrixM ∈ SL2(F2n)
lies in some subfield F2m ≤ F2n , then the order ofM is bounded above by 2m+1. Furthermore,
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if trace(M) = α and F2(α) is a small subfield of F2n , then the order of M will be small.
4.3.2.2 Attack Algorithm
Let F2n be represented as F2(α) where α is a root of an irreducible polynomial p(x) of degree
n. Furthermore, suppose that p(x) is decomposable. That is p(x) = (f◦g)(x) where f, g ∈ F2[x]
and deg(f),deg(g) > 1. Polynomial decompositions can be found efficiently. For instance, [24]
provides a polynomial decomposition algorithm with complexity O(nlogn) for polynomials of
degree n over fields where a polynomial-time polynomial factorization algorithm exists. For
other algorithms see [2, 44, 45, 19].
The attack algorithm calls for finding a matrix M ∈ SL2(F2n) whose trace equals g(α).
In this case, trace(M) is a root of f(x), which must be irreducible since p(x) is irreducible.
Therefore F2(trace(M))/F2 is a degree deg(f(x)) extension field.
By Theorems 4.3.6 and 4.3.7, the order of M is no greater than 2deg(f(x)) + 1. Therefore,
if the the matrix M has order d and M is the hash value of a bitstring of length l, then a
message of length dl hashes to the identity by repeating the bitstring d times.
The major source of complexity in this attack is finding a message which hashes to such a
suitable matrix M . Lemma 4.2.2 states that the trace of the hash of a message of length k < n
is a degree k polynomial. This suggests that a search over bitstrings of length deg(g(x)) should
yield a message which hashes to a matrix with trace g(α). Thus, to limit the search space it is
desirable to construct a decomposition of p(x) where g(x) has a small degree. However, f(x)
must also have a small degree, to limit the order of the resulting matrix.
4.3.2.3 Example
The following example was constructed using the Axiom code provided in Appendix 2.
Consider the field F2100 represented as F2(α) where α is a root of p(x) = x100 + x75 + 1.
Note that p(x) = (x4 + x3 + 1) ◦ (x25).
A search of bitstrings of length 25 discovers that the message
1000000000100000010100110
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hashes to a matrix with trace α25.
Theorem 4.3.6 states that the order of this matrix will less less than 24 + 1 = 17. In this
case, the matrix has order 15.
Therefore, if the bitstring 1000000000100000010100110 is repeated 15 times, the resulting
message of 25 · 15=375 bits will hash to the identity matrix.
4.3.2.4 Practicality of Attack
Unlike the previous attack against the SL2(F2n) hashing scheme, this attack is capable
of finding relatively short messages with colliding hash values. Furthermore, depending on
the decomposition of p(x), the attack can be performed very quickly, as it does not rely on
computing discrete logarithms in a large field.
However, this attack requires that the irreducible polynomial which defines the field repre-
sentation be decomposable. This is extremely rare for practical values of n.
Theorem 4.3.8. As n increases, the percentage of decomposable irreducible polynomials over
F2 approaches 0.
To prove this result, first note the following lemma from [26, pg. 142, Ex. 3.26 & 3.27].
Lemma 4.3.9. Let In be the number of irreducible polynomials of degree n over F2. Then
2n − 2n/2+1 + 2
n
≤ In ≤ 2
n − 2
n
.
First we will find a upper bound on the number of decomposable irreducible polynomials.
Let f(x) be an irreducible polynomial of degree n. Suppose f(x) can be decomposed into
(g ◦ h)(x). Then, deg g · deg h = n and g(x) must be irreducible over F2. Thus, an upper
bound on the number of irreducible decomposable polynomials of degree n is the number of
pairs {g(x), h(x)} such that g(x) is irreducible over F2 and deg g · deg h = n.
For each g(x) ∈ F2[x] of degree d where d|n, h(x) can be any polynomial of degree n/d, of
which there are 2n/d. Also, by Lemma 4.3.9, the number of irreducible polynomials of degree
d is less than 2
d−2
d . Thus, the number of pairs {g(x), h(x)} is less than∑
d|n
2d − 2
d
2n/d =
∑
d|n
2n/d+d − 2
d
.
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Each term of this summation is less than or equal to 2
n/2+2−2
2 . Furthermore, the number
of non-trivial divisors of n is less than log2(n). Thus
∑
d|n
2n/d+d − 2
d
≤ log2(n)
2
(
2n/2+2 − 2
)
.
By Lemma 4.3.9, a lower bound on the number of irreducible polynomials of degree n is
2n−2n/2+2
n . Thus the ratio of irreducible decomposable polynomials of degree n to all irreducible
polynomials of degree n over F2 is less than
log2(n)
2
(
2n/2+2 − 2)
2n−2n/2+2
n
=
n log2(n)
(
2n/2+2 − 2)
2
(
2n − 2n/2 + 2)
≤ n log2(n)
(
2n/2+2 − 2)
2n/4
(
23n/4 − 2n/4 + 2
2n/4
)
≤
(
n log2(n)
2n/4
)(
2n/2+2
23n/4 − 2n/4
)
Using l’Hoˆpital’s rule we can take the limit of n log2(n)
2n/4
as n approaches infinity.
lim
n→∞
n log2(n)
2n/4
= lim
n→∞
ln(n)/ ln(2)
1
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n/4 ln(2)
= lim
n→∞
4 ln(n)
2n/4 ln(2)2
= lim
n→∞
4/n
1
42
4/n ln(2)3
= lim
n→∞
16
n2n/4 ln(2)3
= 0
The limit of the other factor, 2
n/2+2
23n/4−2n/4 , can be taken as follows.
lim
n→∞
2n/2+2
23n/4 − 2n/4 = limn→∞
(
22
2n/4
)(
2n/2
2n/2 − 1
)
= 0 · 1 = 0
Therefore, the limit of the ratio of decomposable irreducible polynomials of degree n to all
irreducible polynomials of degree n approaches 0 as n goes to infinity.
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Table 4.1 Decomposable Irreducible Polynomials
Deg. # Irr. # Irr. Decomp. Ratio Upper Bound Limit Estimate
9 56 9 3.57× 10−2 2.86× 10−1 2.432
15 2182 8 3.67× 10−3 5.13× 10−2 0.499
21 99857 34 3.40× 10−4 4.01× 10−3 0.116
25 1342176 14 1.04× 10−5 1.43× 10−4 0.0345
Figure 4.1 Ratio of Decomposable Irreducible Polynomials (Log Scale)
In the case of this attack, the speed at which this ratio goes to 0 is of importance. The
ratio used to construct the limit,
n log2(n)(2n/2+2−2)
2(2n−2n/2+2) is extremely conservative. But at n = 40,
even this ratio is approximately 0.00038. At n = 128 this ratio is 9.7× 10−17.
Using the computer algebra system Axiom [33], we can find the exact number of decom-
posable irreducible polynomials for some small values of n. The polynomial decomposition
algorithm used in Axiom is an implementation of Algorithm 4 in [24]. This algorithm cannot
decompose a polynomial of degree n if the characteristic of the field divides n.
The results of this program are summarized in Table 4.1. For some small values of n, we
determined the ratio of decomposable irreducible polynomials to the total number of irreducible
polynomials. We also give a ratio based on the upper bound for decomposable irreducible
polynomials, which is the number of pairs {g(x), h(x)} such that g(x) is irreducible over F2 and
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deg g · deg h = n. Finally, we provide a ratio based on the limit calculation, n log2(n)(2
n/2+2−2)
2(2n−2n/2+2) .
These values are plotted in Figure 4.1 using a logarithmic scale.
Note that we can use polynomial decomposition algorithms to determine whether a given
irreducible polynomial is decomposable. Such polynomials should be avoided when choosing a
representation for the field. As the vast majority of irreducible polynomials are indecomposable
it is not difficult to find an appropriate polynomial. Another precaution against this attack is
to choose a irreducible polynomial with prime degree. In this case there can be no non-trivial
polynomial decomposition for p(x).
4.4 Summary
In this chapter we reviewed the Characteristic-2 hash function proposed by Ze´mor and
Tillich in [43]. This hash function is a variation of that given in Chapter 3, operating in
SL2(F2n) as opposed to SL2(Fp). The Characteristic-2 hash function has the property that in
order to obtain a collision by modifying only a small section of bits in a message, that section
must be at least n-bits long.
However, as discussed in Chapter 4.3, two major attacks have been proposed against this
hash function. The first of these attacks creates a system of non-linear multivariate polynomials
over F2 and finds collisions after calculating a small number of discrete logarithms. The second
attack requires decomposing the irreducible polynomial used to represent the field F2n .
Neither of these attacks are capable of mounting a practical attack against the Characteristic-
2 hash function. By carefully choosing the irreducible polynomial p(x) representing the field
we can make it highly unlikely that these attacks would yield a practical collision. First,
n = deg(p(x)) should be prime, making it impossible to find a non-trivial polynomial decompo-
sition. Furthermore, Theorem 4.3.6 implies that if we choose n such that (2n+1)(2n−1) = 3p1p2
for some primes p1, p2, then the group SL2(F2n) will have a small number of elements of small
order. This attempts to prevent attacks which aim to find elements of small order.
Furthermore, when (2n + 1)(2n − 1) = 3p1p2 the orders of A and B will be 2n + 1 or
2n − 1. Additionally, it is desirable for the minimal polynomials of A and B to be irreducible
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over F2n = F2(α). If this condition is not met for a given irreducible polynomial it should be
possible to find a different polynomial where it is met.
While the two attacks presented do not pose an immediate threat to the security of the
Characteristic-2 hash function, they do question it. The algebraic structure of the hash function
can be exploited to create attacks, but it is not clear if a practical attack can be developed.
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CHAPTER 5. VARIATIONS
The hash functions of Chapters 3 and 4 have a common property which is highly useful in
attacks. Recall that because matrix multiplication is associative, one way to find collisions in
these hash functions is to find a message which hashes to the identity matrix. This chapter
discusses two variations of the hash function design which attempt to limit or remove that
vulnerability.
5.1 Previous Work
In [36], Shpilrain identifies two weaknesses of the Tillich-Ze´mor hashing scheme discussed
in Chapter 4, which also apply to the scheme discussed in Chapter 3. First, the matrices A
and B are invertible. Second, the hash function is based on matrix multiplication which is
associative.
Shpilrain proposes a variation of the Tillich-Ze´mor hash function in [36] that avoids these
properties. He does this by simply using elements of the field F2n represented as polynomials
and defining a non-associative binary operator.
5.1.1 Shpilrain’s Variation
Operations in the hash function are performed in the field F2n = F2(α), where α is a root
of an irreducible polynomial p(x) of degree n. Rather than defining two matrices that are the
hashes of 0 and 1 bits, Shpilrain’s variation defines two field elements P (α), Q(α) ∈ F2(α).
Also, fix an additional four elements u1(α), u2(α), v1(α), v2(α) ∈ F2(α) such that u1(α) +
v2(α) 6= u2(α) + v1(α).
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The hash function is built from a binary operation on F2n , which is defined as follows. Let
f(α), g(α) ∈ F2n .
f(α) ◦ g(α) = (f(α) + u1(α)) · (g(α) + u2(α)) · f(α) · v1(α) + g(α) · v2(α)
Shpilrain notes in [36] that this operation is non-associative and non-commutative when u1(α)+
v2(α) 6= u2(α) + v1(α).
A hash function is constructed from this binary operation by splitting a message into fixed
length blocks, computing the hash on each individual block, and combining the hash values
of the blocks. The binary operation is used in both computing the hashes of each block and
combining the block, but in different ways.
A message m is split into blocks B1, B2, . . . , Bl such that blocks B1, . . . Bl−1 each have
length k and Bl has length less than or equal to k.
The hash value of an individual block is computing using the following recursive formula
F : {0, 1}∗ → F2n . Let Bi = b1 · · · bt, with bi ∈ {0, 1} and defined F as
F (b1 . . . bs) =

pi(b1) if s = 1
F (b1 . . . bs−1) ◦ pi(bs) otherwise
where
pi(b) =

P (α) for b = 0
Q(α) for b = 1
.
Next the hash values from each block are combined using the recursive formula H1 : F2n →
F2n defined by
H1(B1 . . . Bs) =

F (B1) if s = 1
H1(F (B1) . . . F (Bs−1)) ◦ F (Bs)) otherwise
.
In particular, Shpilrain suggests the following parameters. To create a 163-bit hash func-
tion, let
p(x) = x163 + x7 + x6 + x5 + x4 + x+ 1
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and P (α) = α7 + 1 and Q(α) = α8 + 1. Furthermore, appropriate choices for the fixed field
elements for ◦ are
u1(α) = α2, u2(α) = α, v1(α) = 1, v2(α) = α+ 1.
For a short list of examples see [36].
5.1.2 Analysis of Shpilrain’s Variation
Certainly the associativity of matrix multiplication creates a vulnerability in Tillich and
Ze´mor’s hash functions. Shpilrain’s proposal indeed creates a non-associative function, but
many details of his design are not clear. In [36] Shpilrain provides no explanation for the
construction of the binary operator ◦, nor any discussion of the security implications of choices
of P (α) and Q(α).
Furthermore, Shpilrain’s claim that these scheme holds the same advantages of the Tillich
and Ze´mor scheme is unfounded. The hash functions of Tillich and Ze´mor relate their security
to the Cayley graph of the groups SL2(Fp) or SL2(F2n). Specifically, they have the property
that collisions involving local modifications of text must involve at least as many bits as the
girth of the graph. Furthermore, finding collisions is equivalent to finding factorizations of the
identity, which they suggest is often hard.
Shpilrain offers no proof of security in this scheme. Collisions in the the hash values of
individual message blocks would be related to the Cayley graph of the quasigroup associated
with the field and the operation, but it is unclear whether one could prove any properties about
the girth of this graph.
On the surface, one would probably expect that Shpilrain’s variation would be more difficult
to attack, but there is no solid evidence of this. In fact, Donghoon Chang has already developed
a preimage attack against this scheme in [6]. Shpilrain’s variation thus is not entirely successful
at solving the security problems with the basic design of Tillich and Ze´mor’s hash functions.
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5.2 Using Left Division
There is an uneasy relationship between algebraic structure and security. If an algorithm
has little structure, such as Shpilrain’s scheme in 5.1, then it can be difficult to prove security
results. However, algorithms with too much structure can often have that structure exploited
in attacks, as was in the case with Tillich and Ze´mor’s schemes. Matrix left division is a
non-associative binary operation that provides a similar level of structure to that of matrix
multiplication.
5.2.1 Hash Function Construction
A naive extension of the Tillich and Ze´mor hash function construction to left division
simply performs matrix left division in place of matrix multiplication. Left division is defined
by x\y = x−1 ·y. Note that for a matrixM =
a b
c d
 ∈ SL2(F2n),M−1 =
d b
c a
. Therefore,
matrix left division is no more computationally expensive than matrix multiplication.
Define SL2(F2n) = 〈A,B〉 as in Chapter 4, pi be the same map from {0, 1} to {A,B} and
m = b0b1 . . . bk be a binary string. Define by hash function H1 : {0, 1}∗ → SL2(F2n) by
H1(b0b1 . . . bk) = pi(b0)\pi(b1)\ · · · \pi(bk)
However, one quickly is able to see a flaw in this design. The messages 00 and 11 hash
to the identity matrix. In particular, concatenating 00 or 11 to the beginning of a message
does not change the hash value. To solve this problem, instead of starting the hash value
computation with the identity matrix, we start with a matrix C that is not a power of A or
B and begin the set of left divisions. An obvious choice for C is C = AB. From this we can
define our hash function as
H2(b0b1 . . . bk) = C\pi(b0)\pi(b1)\ · · · \pi(bk).
This construction still shares the security result between Cayley graphs and collisions. In
Tillich and Ze´mor’s schemes, a collision of two messages could be thought of as two distinct
paths on the Cayley graph associated with A and B using matrix multiplication that start at
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the identity matrix and end at the same group element. In this case, the graph is now obtained
using matrix left division, and the paths start at the matrix C.
5.2.2 Properties
Matrix left division still provides a great deal of algebraic structure. One can quickly see
that hash values of message have the following form.
Proposition 5.2.1. Let m = b0b1 . . . bk be a binary string and P = pi(b0)pi(b2) · · · and Q =
pi(b1)pi(b3) · · · . If k is odd, then
H2(b0b1 . . . bk) = Q−1CP
else when k is even
H2(b0b1 . . . bk) = P−1CQ.
Note that the Characteristic-p and Characteristic-2 hash functions are parallelizable be-
cause matrix multiplication is associative. That is, the computation of the hash function can
be split by splitting the message into smaller pieces, calculating the hash value of those pieces,
and multiplying the results. Furthermore, the hash values can start being computed before
the full message is available.
Because of Proposition 5.2.1, the hash function using left division still has these properties.
If we consider a message as a string of As and Bs, the computation of the hash function is
equivalent to multiplying the values in even-numbered bits and the values in-odd numbered
bits separately. These computations can be performed in parallel before the complete message
is given. Once the complete message is processed this way, one of the two products is inverted,
and multiplied by C and the other product.
One problem with the Tillich and Ze´mor hash functions was that once a factorization of
the identity matrix is found as a product of A’s and B’s, an unlimited number of collisions can
be found, due to the associativity of matrix multiplication. Unfortunately, Proposition 5.2.1
shows that that also applies to the hash function H2.
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Obtaining a factorization of the identity into A’s and B’s is equivalent to finding a message
which hashes to the identity. Suppose s0 . . . sl is a binary message hashing to the identity. We
can insert the string s0s0s1s1 · · · slsl anywhere in a message m to obtain collision in the hash
function. Inserting this string into the message has the effect of inserting pi(s0) · · ·pi(sl) into P
and Q. Since pi(s0) · · ·pi(sl) equal the identity matrix, it does not change the values of P and
Q.
5.2.3 Embedding Message Length
The problem of being able to insert a message which hashes to the identity matrix in order
to obtain a collision is analogous to a problem with iterated hash functions. Recall that hash
functions using MD-construction encode the the length of the message as the last block of the
message, a process known as MD-strengthening.
Iterated hash functions split a message into blocks and iterate over the blocks using a
compression function. A general attack against an iterated hash function that does not use MD-
strengthening works as follows. Let H ′ be the iterated hash function and m be some message
that is a multiple of the block size of H ′. Note that H ′(m) = h′ is a binary message with a
length equal to the block size of H ′. Because of the construction of iterated hash functions,
H ′(m||m′) = H ′(h′||m′), where m′ is an arbitrary bitstring. This attack was countered by
encoding the length of the message as the final block in the iterated hash function. Thus,
since the lengths of the two messages vary, the result of the hash function will vary in the final
iteration of the hash function.
We can extend the hash function H2 to use this idea. Recall that that hash function begins
with some matrix C. We can encode the length of a message by starting with the matrix
C raised to the length of the message power. Note that if one chooses C = AB, then the
order of C will be far greater than the length of any reasonable message, and thus messages
of different length will start with a different initial matrix. Thus we can define hash function
H3 : {0, 1}∗ → SL2(F2n) by
H3(b0b1 . . . bk) = Ck\pi(b0)\pi(b1)\ · · · \pi(bk).
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The hash function H3 is resistant to attacks which merely insert a message which hashes to
the identity, as the resulting message differs in length from the original message.
Collisions in this hash function can still be thought as two distinct paths through the Cayley
graph. In this case, however, the paths generally have different starting vertices. In this sense,
the starting vertex is the matrix Ck, where k is the length of the message being hashed.
This does have an effect on the security properties of this hash function. Recall that
collisions using the hash function H2 can be thought of as two paths through the Cayley graph
associated with the elements of 〈A,B〉 with left division as the operation, with equal starting
and ending vertices. Collisions from local modification of text will need to involve bitstrings
of length no less than the girth of the graph. However since in H3 colliding messages generally
have different starting vertices, the girth only provides protection from local modifications
when the colliding messages have equal length.
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CHAPTER 6. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSIONS
6.1 Future Work
Chapter 4.3.2 discussed an attack developed in [38] that uses the decomposition of the
irreducible polynomial defining the field F2n to find group elements which have small order.
However, we showed that very few irreducible polynomials have a non-trivial decomposition,
thus greatly limiting the practicality of this attack.
It may be possible to extend the attack in [38] to work even when the original defining
irreducible polynomial is indecomposable. It seems to be the case that for most composite
integers n, there exists an irreducible polynomial of degree n over F2 that has a non-trivial
polynomial decomposition. Suppose F2n is represented as F2[x]/〈p(x)〉, and suppose we can
find a second irreducible polynomial p′(x) of equal degree which is decomposable. We can
use the attack in [38] to find a message which hashes to a matrix with small order when the
computations are performed over F2[x]/〈p′(x)〉. An interesting question is whether we can use
that result to attack the hash function when computations are performed over F2[x]/〈p(x)〉.
There are many open questions related to variations of the Tillich-Ze´mor hashing scheme
using quasigroups. The variations discussed in Chapter 5 create quasigroups by using non-
associative binary operations in place of matrix multiplication. We could use this approach
with any large quasigroup whose operation can be computed efficiency on a computer. Meyer
addressed the problem of creating and representing large non-associative quasigroups in [30].
Those ideas could be used to create other quasigroup-based variations of the hashing scheme.
Also, the hash functions in Chapter 5 have the common problem that they offer little or
no proof of security. These functions, along with any other variation based on quasigroups, do
not have the same degree of structure as the original hash functions. Still, it may be possible
51
to develop proofs of security for hash functions of this design.
6.2 Conclusions
Hash functions play a vital role in maintaining the integrity of information in the digital
age. As discussed in Chapter 2, hash functions are one-way, collision resistant functions that
are generally built from block ciphers. Recent attacks have found weaknesses in the most
commonly used hash functions today, causing some cryptographers to call for the creation of
new hash functions built on mathematical principles.
Chapters 3 and 4 discussed two related hash functions based on matrix multiplication over
SL2(Fp) and SL2(F2n). In the case of the hash function over SL2(Fp), the scheme quickly fell
to an attack which can find factorization of the identity matrix very quickly. While this attack
only directly works for a particular pair of generators for SL2(Fp), alternative generating sets
are unlikely to offer a significantly improved level of security.
In Chapter 4 we discussed a hash function operating over SL2(F2n). As field operations
in F2n can be performed efficiently on computers, this function appears to be practical from a
computational standpoint. However, as discussed in Chapter 4.3, there have been two attacks
developed against this hash function. The first of these attacks creates a system of non-linear
equations and uses discrete logarithms to find a collision. However, the colliding messages
are extremely long, and the likelihood of finding collisions with messages of reasonable length
appears to be insignificant. The second attack requires that the irreducible polynomial defining
the field F2n be decomposable. Such polynomials can easily be avoided when choosing a
representation of the field for the construction of the hash function.
Neither attack poses a credible threat to the security of the hash function. However, they
are two examples of undesirable properties of this hash function and they suggest that more
serious attacks could be developed. For instance, we do know that SL2(F2n) contains elements
of small order. The fact that the attack described in Chapter 4.3.2 is capable of finding such
elements quickly in limited circumstances suggests that other attacks could be developed that
work in more general cases.
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It should be noted that both the hash function over SL2(Fp) and the hash function over
SL2(F2n) have a security claim. The hash functions are related to the Cayley graph of the
group with respect to the generators {A,B}. Specifically, colliding messages can be thought of
as two paths through this graph that begin at the identity matrix and end at an arbitrary group
element. At a minimum, two colliding messages must differ in at least two bits k locations
apart, where k is the girth of the Cayley graph. In practice, however, this provides no real
level of security.
Most attacks against these hash functions make use of the associativity of matrix multi-
plication. Because of this, once a message is found that hashes to the identity matrix, that
message can be inserted into any other message to obtain a collision. In Chapter 5 we consid-
ered different variations of the hash function design that use quasigroups instead of the special
linear group of 2 × 2 matrices over a finite field. These variations offer protection against
known attacks, but have no proven security claims involving a minimum bound on the girth of
the Cayley graphs. Despite the fact that such a claim would offer little practical security, this
is troubling as hash functions based on these quasigroups appear to have no advantage over
traditional hash functions, which also tend to lack practical security proofs.
None of the hash functions presented in this paper would be suitable replacements for SHA-
1, MD-5 or other commonly used hash functions. All evidence suggests that these functions
are slower and less secure than hash functions constructed in more traditional ways. However,
hash functions constructed using algebraic structures have the potential for offering provable
security claims and will continued to be studied.
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APPENDIX A. Discrete Log Attack Implementation in Axiom
++Set up field of order 2^60
GF2:=PrimeField 2 m:=monomial(1,1)$SUP(GF2)
deg:=60;
p1:=createIrreduciblePoly(deg)$FFPOLY(GF2)
F1:=FFP(GF2,p1)
x:=index(2)$F1
++Set up deg 2 extension (order 2^(2*60))
p2:=createIrreduciblePoly(2*deg)$FFPOLY(GF2)
F2:=FFP(GF2,p2);
y:=index(2)$F2;
xhat:=x::F2
k:=(2^(deg*2)-1)/(2^deg-1);
++ Set up generators for SL_2
A:=matrix[[x,1],[1,0]];
B:=matrix[[x,x+1],[1,1]];
C:=A^160*B^258
Itwo:=matrix[[x^0,0*x],[0*x,x^0]]
++Create system of equations for a possible collision
ls:List Symbol:=[lambda1,mu1,lambda2,mu2,lambda3,mu3];
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ls2:List Symbol:=[lambda1,mu1,lambda2,mu2,lambda3,mu3,new()$Symbol]
RHS:=(lambda1*A + mu1*Itwo)*(lambda2*B + mu2*Itwo)*(lambda3*A +mu3*Itwo);
p1:=RHS(1,1)-C(1,1);
p2:=RHS(1,2)-C(1,2);
p3:=RHS(2,1)-C(2,1);
p4:=RHS(2,2)-C(2,2);
p5:=determinant lambda1*A+mu1*Itwo)-1;
p6:=determinant (lambda2*B+mu2*Itwo)-1;
p7:=determinant(lambda3*A+mu3*Itwo)-1;
polys:=[p1,p2,p3,p4,p5,p6,p7];
++(Attempt to) solve the system and copy a solution
soln:=solve([p1=0,p2=0,p3=0,p4=0,p5=0,p6=0,p7=0],ls);
solnum:=1;
l1:= eval(lambda1,soln(solnum))::F1;
l2:= eval(lambda2,soln(solnum))::F1;
l3:= eval(lambda3,soln(solnum))::F1;
m1:= eval(mu1,soln(solnum))::F1;
m2:= eval(mu2,soln(solnum))::F1;
m3:= eval(mu3,soln(solnum))::F1;
++let beta be a root of min poly for A
temp:=solve(t^2+(xhat)*t+1);
beta:=eval(t,temp(1))::F2;
++Check conditions on the order of A
++ These values below must be 1 for
++ the attack to work
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(l1::F2*beta+m1::F2)^(order(beta))
(l3::F2*beta+m3::F2)^(order(beta))
++If so, calculate the discrete logarithms
i1:=discreteLog(beta,(l1::F2)*beta+(m1::F2))
i3:=discreteLog(beta,(l3::F2)*beta+(m3::F2))
++Now, let gamma be a root of min poly for B
temp:=solve(t^2+(xhat+1)*t+1=0);
gamma:=eval(t,temp(1))::F2;
++Check condition on the order of B
++ This value must be 1, or attack fails
(l2::F2*gamma+m2::F2)^(order(gamma))
++If so, calculate discrete logarithm
i2:=discreteLog(gamma,(l2::F2)*gamma+(m2::F2))
(A^i1*B^i2*A^i3=C)@Boolean
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APPENDIX B. Small Order Attack Implementation in Axiom
++Function: revbitstring
++ Input: A positive integer, n
++ Output: the binary representation of n
++ in a list with the least significant
++ bit first
revbitstring(0)==[0]::List NonNegativeInteger;
revbitstring(1)==[1]::List NonNegativeInteger;
revbitstring(n)==cons(rem(n,2),revbitstring(shift(n,-1)));
++Function: mybitstring
++ Input: A positive integer, n
++ Output: Binary representation with the most
++ significant bit first
mybitstring(n)==reverse(revbitstring(n));
++Function: TZHash
++ Input: A list containing 0s and 1s
++ Output: The Tillich-Zemor hash value of the message
++ over the field F_{2^100}
TZHash(msg)==
GF2:=PrimeField 2;
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m:=monomial(1,1)$SUP(GF2);
p1:=m^100+m^75+1;
F1:=FFP(GF2,p1);
x:=index(2)$F1;
A:=matrix[[x,1],[1,0]];
B:=matrix[[x,x+1],[1,1]];
Itwo:=matrix[[x^0,0*x],[0*x,x^0]];
h:=Itwo;
for i in msg repeat
if i=0 then h:=h*A else h:=h*B
h
++Function: mytrace
++ Input: A 2x2 matrix
++ Output: The sum of the diagnonal entries
mytrace(temp)==temp(1,1)+temp(2,2);
++Function: searchBitStrings
++ Inputs:
++ poly: a polynomial over F_2
++ degp: the degree of poly
++ Output: a bitstring whose hash value has a trace equal to poly
searchBitStrings(poly,degp)==
local temphash;
for j in (2^(degp-1))::Integer..(2^degp)::Integer repeat
print(j);
temphash:=TZHash(mybitstring(j));
if (mytrace(temphash)=poly)@Boolean then return mybitstring(j)
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"error"
++ Function: determineOrder
++ Inputs:
++ mat: a matrix in SL_2(F_{2^100})
++ num: an upper bound on the order of mat
++ Output: the order of mat
++ Note: This function is quite slow. There are several
++ ways to improve this function, but none are necessary
++ to demonstrate this attack
determineOrder(mat,num)==
GF2:=PrimeField 2;
m:=monomial(1,1)$SUP(GF2);
p1:=m^100+m^75+1;
F1:=FFP(GF2,p1);
x:=index(2)$F1;
Itwo:=matrix[[x^0,0*x],[0*x,x^0]];
for z in 1..num::Integer repeat
print(z);
t:=mat^z;
if (t=Itwo)@Boolean then return z
"unknown"
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